The Harper Law Blog

The Harper Law Blog offers news, announcements, thoughts and articles on life, law and our practice areas of emphasis.

Parental Responsibility for the Child’s Negligent Entrustment of their Car

Posted Saturday, January 06, 2018 by Ed Harper

In the State of Washington, law the owner of a car may incur liability under the family car doctrine for injuries caused by third person to whom a family member has entrusted the car if the car was used for the pleasure and convenience of a family member. Cameron v. Downs, 32 Wn.App. 875, at 880. See prior blog post 10/9/2009: Family Car – Liability Issues,

http://edharperlaw.com/blog/2009/10/familycar__lia/ (1982).

In Cameron v. Downs, Steven Downs was driving a van in which Stephen Cameron was a passenger. Cameron was killed due to the negligence of Downs. Cameron’s father brought a wrongful death action for his son’s death. Brenda Downs, the daughter of A. E. Downs, the owner of the vehicle, loaned the vehicle to Steven Downs, her brother. Brenda Downs knew her father had rules prohibiting Steven to drive due to a bad driving history. The question arose whether the parent as owner of the vehicle should be found responsible as the father had forbidden and established rules to prevent Steven Downs from driving.

The question hinged on whether Brenda had the authority and ability to bind her father, creating liability for him when she loaned the vehicle to her brother. The court determined yes, the owner of the car was still responsible. The family car doctrine is grounded in agency, which creates liability for the principal due to the actions of their agent. One cannot escape liability merely because the automobile was being used in a manner forbidden at the time of the accident. Cameron at 880. (Other cites omitted). It follows that an act although forbidden or done in a forbidden manner, may be within the scope of one’s agency. Restatement 2nd of Agency, section 228 (1958).Among the matters of fact to be considered in determining if an agent’s conduct, although not authorized, is nevertheless within the scope of her agency at the time, place and purpose of the act, and whether or not the master had reason to expect that such act would be done. Restatement 2nd of Agency, section 229 (1958).

In addition a trier of fact should determine if despite his admonitions to his family, A. E. Downs had reason to expect that Brenda might loan the van to Steven. Cameron v. Downs, at 881.

The court held that it was a factual question (so the jury would decide) whether it was foreseeable for Brenda to loan the family vehicle to her brother, someone forbidden to drive at the time of the accident. If it was foreseeable, then the father was or could be found responsible for his daughter’s actions even though he had forbidden her from loaning the vehicle to her brother.

This can be very troubling for parents to comprehend that even if they establish rules they may be responsible for their family members negligent actions.

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Washington Public Policy Encourages Broad Insurance Coverage for Injured Persons

Posted Thursday, January 04, 2018 by Ed Harper

In insurance policy disputes, the court will look to insurance policy, to determine if the policy has the proper phrases and blank which allow the insurance company and the insured to understand their rights and responsibilities

Before an accident occurs, a person should often ask themselves the question, “Will I be covered if a certain event occurs?”

In underinsured motorist claims where an at-fault driver is not insured, or not insured with enough protection, courts will review these claims based on a presumption to protect injured persons from financially irresponsible motorists. The fundamental principle underlying this case is that RCW 48.22.030 expresses a legislative purpose to broaden the protection of injured persons from financially irresponsible motorists. Supra at 289-90.

See Brown v. Snohomish County Physicians Corp, 120 Wn.2d 747 (1993):

“The underinsured motorist statute (RCW 48.22.030) is intended to allow an injured party to recover those damages which that party would have recovered had the responsible party been insured with liability limits as broad as the injured party’s statutorily mandated underinsured motorist coverage limits.”

In Liljestrand v State Farm Ins. Co., 47 Wn.App.283 (1987), the court allowed an underinsured/uninsured (UIM) claim to go forward for a phantom vehicle even though there were no independent witnesses to the accident. The RCW had certain requirements requiring independent verification. The court held that an insurance policy which was more broad than the minimum statutory requirements allowed the claimant’s UIM claim to go forward.

Therefore in the UIM setting, if an insurance policy is silent on certain exclusions or requirements, the court will typically find for the insured. In Liljestrand, David Liljestrand was driving his truck on Interstate 5 when his vehicle left the roadway and rolled over. He was seriously injured. There were no independent witnesses to the accident. Liljestrand claims he was forced off the road by an unidentified motor vehicle which had no contact with his vehicle and had the scene. Liljestrand had had an insurance policy with State Farm insurance company which provided for uninsured motorist coverage. The definition for an uninsured motor vehicle included a motor vehicle which is a hit and run a vehicle, whose operator owner cannot be identified, and which hits or causes an accident resulting in bodily injury (even without hitting you or your vehicle).

The court couched the issue “if the statutory limitations on required coverage for accidents caused by the phantom vehicles automatically apply to an insurance policy that does not contain such limitations”. Liljestrand, page 286. The basic rule for UIM recovery for injuries caused by the actions of phantom vehicles, and as stated by RCW 48.22.030, requires certain proof to be established via corroborating evidence – see previous blog post – http://edharperlaw.com/Blog/2017/12/Phantom-Vehicle-What-is-not-Corroborating-Evidence .

However, when an insurance contract/policy does not have the limiting factors of the requirement for establishing proof with corroborating evidence, then the more broadened perspective on coverage is followed. The insurance contract between the parties did not contain the corroborating evidence requirement, which is a more restrictive limitation. Without the corroborating evidence requirement, the court reasoned allows the plaintiff to bring a UIM claim.

“Under Washington law, an automobile policy must specifically contain the independent corroboration requirement set forth in RCW 48.22.030 (8) for any claim arising from an incident with a phantom vehicle in order to enforce that statutory requirement….“As the insurance policy allows for broader coverage than the statute mandates, we can conclude that, the language of the policy must control over the statute.” Liljestrand page 290.

Finally, the Liljestrand court states “we hold, therefore, that RCW 48.22.030 establishes minimum requirements for coverage of insured persons involved in auto accidents with phantom vehicles.” Supra, page 290.

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Phantom Vehicle - What is not Corroborating Evidence

Posted Friday, December 29, 2017 by Ed Harper

An uninsured motorist claim can be brought when an unknown, third-party has caused the collision. In order to prove that a “Phantom Vehicle” caused the collision, independent evidence, not coming from the claimant or claimant’s family can establish this proof. An excited utterance can be used as corroborating evidence, under the right circumstances.

In the case, Burmeister v. State Farm Ins. Co., 92 Wn.App. 359 (1998) the court establishes statements made to a medical doctor standing alone were insufficient and inadmissible under a hearsay exception for an excited utterance, as corroborating evidence of a phantom vehicle. “(Plaintiff) Burmeister failed to establish, facts as would be admissible in evidence, the existence of a phantom vehicle.” (Burmeister at 362)

In Burmeister, the plaintiff, Diane Burmeister, who was the driver and sole occupant of her vehicle, drove off the road and down an embankment. Plaintiff Burmeister filed a UIM claim against her insurance company, State Farm Mutual. “Burmeister contends that an oncoming car in her lane caused her to lose control on some pea gravel in the roadway.” (Burmeister at 363)

State Farm moved for summary judgment arguing Burmeister could not corroborate the existence of a phantom vehicle with admissible evidence other than her own testimony. Plaintiff Burmeister offered statements she made to the investigating police officer and the medical personnel who treated her after the accident. The case was dismissed as Plaintiff Burmeister failed to establish, with facts which would be admissible in evidence, the existence of an at-fault vehicle. Corroborating evidence must verify the claimant’s version of the facts: “‘it’ is something which leads an impartial and reasonable mind to believe that material testimony is true, testimony of some substantial factor circumstance independent of a statement of a witness.” (Gerken v. Mutual of Enumclaw, 74 Wn.App. 220, 225 – 26 (1994).

Regarding statements within her medical records, Plaintiff Burmeister attempted to show that her statements were excited utterances, stating they were spontaneous or instinctive utterances of thought and not the product of premeditation, reflection, or design. (Beck v Dye, 200 Wash. 1 (1939).

Burmeister failed to provide any information from the medical personnel to show she was still under the influence of the accident at the time of the statement being given. Instead, she merely argues that the medical evidence proves that her statement was made spontaneously. Therefore, “Burmeister cannot connect her medical evidence with the foundation requirements that her statement was made while she was still under the stress of excitement caused by the event.” (State v. Brown, 127 Wn.2d 749 (1995), “and that it was not the product of premeditation, reflection, or design.” (Beck at 10)

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Recovery from One-Car Motor Vehicle Collisions

Posted Monday, December 18, 2017 by Ed Harper

Often cars/drivers must react to the negligence of other drivers and this seems rather obvious. But, as a result of those reactions, if one crashes their car, through no fault of their own, they may make a claim for underinsured motorist coverage with their own insurance company. This may be the only recourse available. The Revised Code of Washington (RCW) states:

“ ‘Underinsured motor vehicle’ means a motor vehicle regarding the ownership, maintenance, or use of which either no bodily injury or property damage liability bond or insurance policy applies at the time of an accident, or with respect to which the sum of the limits of liability under all bodily injury or property damage liability bonds and insurance policies applicable to a covered person after an accident is less than the applicable damages which the covered person is legally entitled to recover.” 48.22.030(1).

This means the other side either has no insurance coverage for the accident or there is only limited coverage available.

Additionally, the vehicle/driver which caused the accident is also known as a phantom vehicle because one may not know the identity of the driver/vehicle and therefore cannot bring a viable claim against an unknown party. The RCW defines phantom vehicle as:

“For this chapter [RCW 48)] a ‘phantom vehicle’ shall mean a motor vehicle which causes bodily injury, death, or property damage to an insured and has no physical contact with the insured or the vehicle which the insured is occupying at the time of the accident if:(a) the facts of the accident can be corroborated by competent evidence other than the testimony of the insured or any person having an UIM claim resulting from the accident; and(b) the accident has been reported to the appropriate law enforcement agency within 72 hours of the accident.” RCW 48.22.030(8).

As one can see, these requirements are very specific. Further, the term “corroborating evidence” in section (a) has been defined as evidence which “must tend to verify the claimant’s version of the facts and it is something which leads an impartial and reasonable mind to believe that the material testimony is true, testimony of some substantial fact or circumstance independent of the statement of a witness.” Gerkin v. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 74 Wn.App.220, 225-26 (1994).

The corroboration must verify the claimant’s version of the accident independent of the injured person/claimant. One must also look to the insurance policy which must contain the independent corroboration requirement in RCW 48.22.030(8) for any claim arising from an incident with a phantom vehicle in order to enforce that statutory requirement. Liljestrand v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 47 Wn.App. 283, 290 (1987). The court is looking for independent evidence. Evidence cannot come from the claimant’s or claimant’s family which may be biased.

If you have been injured in a one car accident through no fault of your own, and you have questions whether you may bring a UIM claim, call Ed Harper at Harper Law 425-284-3333.

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Reliability of Evidence - Evidence Rule 403

Posted Monday, December 11, 2017 by Ed Harper

Evidence Rule 403 stands for the proposition that evidence which is more prejudicial than probative should be excluded from a jury’s purview. A recent unpublished decision, Gilmore v. Jefferson County Public Transportation, (Jefferson Transit) rendered by Division 2 of the Court of Appeals of Washington on April 25, 2017, concluded that a trial court committed reversible error when the court granted the exclusion of the expert witness under Evidence Rule 403. The case has now been brought up to the Supreme Court of Washington.

Defendant Jefferson Transit had proposed the testimony of Allen Tencer, PhD, a biomechanical engineer, that Mr. Gilmore could not have been injured in this collision. Or more specifically, Tencer calculated the forces which occurred to be below the speed necessary for one to be injured. Jefferson Transit did not submit Tencer’s opinion as a medical opinion but merely this proved the collision did not rise to the level of severity where one could be injured.

Dr. Tencer has testified numerous times in “low crash - no cash” injury claims. While Tencer has significant education and experience in biomechanics relative to injury prevention, the trial court precluded the admission of his testimony because it was “intended to create an inference with some aura of authority” and the court felt this evidence was not reasonable or justified.

Tencer’s opinion, according to the trial court, would be prejudicial to plaintiff Gilmore not out-weighed by the probative value of the evidence. Dr. Tencer, by looking at photographs, and making certain assumptions, almost always concludes that the forces experienced in a motor vehicle collision were not sufficient to overcome the threshold of injury. Additionally, as well as providing the defense testimony with an aura of authority, the trial court concluded that Tencer’s opinion would be confusing and misleading to the jury.

Plaintiff Gilmore pointed out to the court there are deficiencies in Tencer’s testing methods. Further, according to Plaintiff Gilmore, Tencer provided speculative testimony on the speed of the defendant’s bus, the damage done to the vehicles, and the plaintiff’s height and weight. In sum, Plaintiff Gilmore contested Tencer’s opinions and his extrapolations from mere averages, and from crash tests different than the situation in each particular case. Therefore, Dr. Tencer’s opinion should not be presented to the jury as it is prejudicial and unreliable under ER 403. It will be interesting to see how the Supreme Court of Washington Rules on this case.

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